In this paper we set out and defend a view on which properly basic empirical beliefs are justified by sensory experience.


I guess I'm just a good-old-fashioned internalist.

—Keith Yandell

A prominent position in philosophy of religion today is that religious experience can justify religious belief. Even philosophers who defend traditional arguments for the existence of God often hold that religious experience is an important source of justification for religious belief. However, beneath this consensus about the epistemic value of religious experience there is actually a plethora of distinct theories of exactly how a religious experience can justify a religious belief. We can divide these theories along two different dimensions. First, there is the distinction between inferential and non-inferential justification. One might hold that religious experiences justify religious beliefs through some sort of inference or argument. In other words, religious experiences constitute the basis for a justified inference or argument to certain religious beliefs, and it is only through such inference or argument that a religious experience can justify a religious belief. By contrast, one might hold that a religious experience can justify a religious belief non-inferentially. This is the position defended by Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and Keith Yandell,
among others. One of the most important developments in the philosophy of religion in the last half of the twentieth century was the development and defense of the thesis that a religious experience can justify a religious belief non-inferentially.

However, there is another important distinction to be made within the non-inferential family of views. Some views in this family hold that a religious experience can justify a religious belief if and only if the process that produces the belief (through the experience) is reliable, or constitutes the proper functioning of the subject’s faculties in an appropriate environment. According to such a view, it is the reliability of the process, or the proper functioning of the subject, that ultimately explains the fact that the religious experience justifies the religious belief. This sort of view is now commonly called an *externalist* view about justification, because it grounds the justificational status of a belief in a fact that is external to the subject’s own subjective point of view. Neither the reliability of the process that produced a belief, nor the proper functioning of the faculties of the subject is available to the subject from her own, subjective point of view. This is precisely the source of most of the criticism of externalism about justification. By contrast, an internalist holds that the justificational status of a belief must be, in some important sense, internal to the subject’s own subjective perspective. According to the internalist, that which justifies a belief must be, in some important sense, internal to the mind of the subject, and available to her from within her own subjective point of view.

The externalist approach to the epistemic value of religious experience has been widely discussed. However, the externalist approach is not the only approach to the epistemic value of religious experience. One might hold that a religious experience can justify a religious belief non-inferentially, and simply in virtue of the intrinsic quality of
the experience itself. In other words, it is the intrinsic nature of the experience, which is available to the subject from her own subjective perspective, that justifies the religious belief in question. This view of the epistemic value of religious experience is both internalist and foundationalist. One attractive feature of this view is that it would enable one to defend the thesis that religious experience can justify religious belief without having to defend externalism in epistemology. However, the internalist, foundationalist theory can be correct only if internalist foundationalism itself is a defensible epistemology. In other words, it is possible for a religious experience to justify a religious belief in an internalist, foundationalist way only if it is possible, in general, for an experience of some kind to justify a belief of some kind in an internalist, foundationalist way. According to many philosophers, this is not possible. According to them, internalist foundationalism is a hopeless theory. In this chapter, we intend to show that this verdict is mistaken. Internalist foundationalism is a defensible theory, and so one need not be an externalist in order to hold that religious experience can justify religious beliefs non-inferentially.

Foundationalists end the well-known regress of justification by appealing to beliefs that are properly basic.

They are justified, but not justified by further beliefs or belief-like states. The principal task for a foundationalist is to explain exactly how properly basic beliefs—epistemic “prime movers”—acquire positive epistemic status or justification. On this question, a foundationalist could be either an externalist or an internalist. An externalist will say that a belief is properly basic if it is formed in the right sort of way (by a reliable cognitive process, or in a way that tracks the truth) and it is not justified by other beliefs.
This account has at least the virtue of simplicity. By contrast, the internalist’s task of giving an account of what makes it the case that a belief is properly basic is more complicated. The standard account is that, for many of our beliefs, it is experience that provides the justification for properly basic beliefs.

However, spelling out precisely what this amounts to is a very difficult enterprise.

In this chapter we want to set out and defend what we take to be a promising account of internalist proper basicality. We will begin by spelling out what we will take internalism to be. Then we will look at two recent accounts of internalist properly basic belief—those of Richard Fumerton and Lawrence BonJour. Finally, we will examine three objections to an account like ours, and defend the account against them.

4.1 Internalism

There are many sorts of epistemic internalism. The weakest form, which we will call “supervenience internalism” claims merely that justification supervenes on one’s internal states.

The strongest forms, which we will call “strong access internalism,” claim that if a belief B is justified, then one must have a justified belief B1 that B is justified.

It is difficult for a foundationalist to adopt such strong access requirements; it is not a coincidence that the demand for this sort of access led BonJour to coherentism. The sort of internalism that we will defend here could be called “moderate internalism,” since it lies somewhere between supervenience internalism and strong access internalism, though perhaps closer to the latter than former. If a belief B is justified, we maintain that one must have access to one’s justification J for believing B.
Furthermore, one must have access to the fact that J justifies B.

One may have this sort of access without having a further belief B1 that serves to justify B. But in the case where B is inferentially justified, one must be able to form such a justifying belief, even if one doesn’t form it.

The intuitions that lead us to adopt this sort of internalism are the sorts of intuitions that lead philosophers to adopt internalism in the first place. It is difficult to see how one might have a justified belief B if one has no access to reasons for holding it. Furthermore, if one doesn’t have access to the fact that one’s reasons for holding B are reasons for holding B, then it is difficult to see how those could be reasons for holding B.

Suppose a subject S walks in the house and sees smoke coming from the kitchen. A moment later, S smells a smell just like the smell produced when one burns toast. S then forms the belief that someone has burned toast in the kitchen. If S is justified in believing that someone has burned toast in the kitchen, S must be able to access her reasons for thinking this (that there is a burned-toast smell and that there is smoke). If S does access them and they become beliefs (here, they likely already would be beliefs S has), then for them to serve as justifiers for S’s belief that someone burned toast in the kitchen, S needs to believe that these make rational her belief that someone burned toast in the kitchen.

We take justification to be a *sui generis* positive epistemic property.

It is not truth-conducive; it can be had in a demon-world. Moreover, it isn’t reducible to deontological concepts, such as being blameless in holding a belief, though
there might be broadly logical entailments between the concept of justification and various deontological concepts. We think it is clear that what one ought to believe is conceptually posterior to what one is justified in believing. There are fundamental epistemic duties to believe propositions that one is justified in believing, and it is difficult to see how the justification in these obligations can be analyzed away deontologically.

Thus, the internalism that we will work with here requires access to one’s reasons for holding a belief, as well as access to the epistemic connections between the reasons and belief. Justification is a *sui generis*, non-truth-conducive epistemic property.

### 4.2 Two Accounts of the Justification of Properly Basic Beliefs

We turn now to the main topic in this chapter: The justification of properly basic beliefs on an internalist picture. We begin by examining two recent accounts, due to Richard Fumerton and Lawrence BonJour.

**4.2.1 Fumerton**

Richard Fumerton proposes an account whereby properly basic belief is secured principally by a *sui generis* acquaintance relation with facts in the world. So, Fumerton:

My suggestion is that one has a noninferential justification for believing p when one has the thought that P and one is acquainted with the fact that P, *and* the fact which is the thought that P’s corresponding to the fact that P . . . When everything that is *constitutive* of a thought’s being true is immediately before consciousness, there is nothing more that one could want or need to justify a belief.
What is acquaintance? Fumerton, again:

Acquaintance is *not* another intentional state to be construed as a nonrelational property of the mind. Acquaintance is a *sui generis relation* that holds between a self and a thing, property, or fact. To be acquainted with a fact is *not by itself* to have any kind of knowledge or justified belief, and for that reason I would prefer not to use the old terminology of knowledge by acquaintance.

Crucially, acquaintance is not a belief, nor a belief-like state, and thus can play a role in justifying beliefs without itself requiring justification. However, this seems to be an untenable position, given that one can be acquainted with the fact that one’s thought that P corresponds to the fact that P. This state certainly seems to *represent* the world as being one way rather than another, and thus it is difficult to see how it isn’t the sort of thing that would admit of justification. Is this a damning problem for Fumerton; is he thereby doomed to a regress of justification? We don’t think he is. BonJour, as we will see, faces a similar problem. So let’s first look at BonJour’s account of properly basic belief and return to this problem with Fumerton’s acquaintance.

**4.2.2 BonJour**

BonJour has developed a characteristically sophisticated account of properly basic belief. For BonJour, there are four important elements to be considered when we examine the justification of basic beliefs.

First, there is the basic belief (call it “B1”) with its “descriptive content”—call this “DC.” Second, there is an awareness of an experience with particular sensory content (call the
sensory content “SC” and the awareness of SC “ASC”). Third, there is a matching, or correspondence between DC and SC. Fourth, there is an awareness of the correspondence between DC and SC; call this “AM” (for “awareness of matching”).

How does a basic belief become properly basic on BonJour’s account? B1 will (at least typically) be an appearance belief (e.g. *I believe it appears to me as though there is a red square before me*). If this belief is justified, one is able to “see” via introspection that the content of this belief (DC) “matches” some of the subject’s sensory imagery. So, if B1 is justified, one will have before one’s mind a sensory image of a red square (SC), and one will be aware of it (ASC). The seeing of the “fit” (AM) between DC and SC is what guarantees justification of the appearance belief.

Is AM doxastic and thus subject to requirements of justification (as Fumerton’s acquaintance relation seems to be)? As was the case with Fumerton’s acquaintance relation, it is difficult to see how AM isn’t doxastic. It is a state that represents the world as being a certain way, and so it’s hard to see why justification wouldn’t be required for this sort of state. Now, BonJour might follow Fumerton and admit that this state is very much belief-like apart from the troublesome bit—being subject to justificatory appraisal. But this sort of move seems ad hoc at best.

However, BonJour’s actual answer doesn’t fare much better. He says:

One possible objection to such a view . . . would focus on this apprehending or recognizing and insist that it must be regarded as a further, independent cognitive state, just as much in need of justification as any other, and so of no help to the foundationalist. But any such view seems to me to be mistaken. . . . What is crucial here is the nature of e-awareness [ASC] itself. When I am e-aware of an
experiential feature, it is genuinely present in my consciousness. . . . I may have to selectively focus in order to pick out that feature and come to see that its character fits a particular description [this is AM], but the awareness of it that allows me to do these things is just the original e-awareness itself. When I am e-aware of an experiential feature, it is genuinely present in my consciousness. Because many other things are present there as well, I may have to selectively focus in order to pick out that feature and come to see that its character fits a particular description, but the awareness of it that allows me to do these things is just the original awareness itself.

It is difficult to see how this is supposed to go. It is true that AM requires ASC—one has to be aware of the relevant sensory content to be aware of its matching DC. But there is more to AM than being aware of SC. One also is aware of the fit between DC and SC, and this certainly looks to be doxastic or the sort of thing justification could apply to. So we don’t think that BonJour makes any sort of convincing case that AM—the state that plays the same sort of role in his theory as acquaintance plays in Fumerton’s—is non-doxastic and not subject to questions of justification.

4.3 An Account of Internalist Properly Basic Belief

One clear way in which experience could justify empirical beliefs is for the experience to be the basis of empirical beliefs. How should one think of this basing relation? It seems to us that both BonJour and Fumerton are correct in thinking of the core of the basing relation as being a matching or fitting relation, and that BonJour is correct in thinking of the relation as a fitting between belief and experience. There are, of
course, other ways to think about the basing relationship. Most obviously, one might think of it causally, for instance: A belief B is based on an experience E if E causes B. But it seems clear that an experience might cause a belief without justifying it. Suppose that experience of a particularly striking natural view causes a subject S to believe that the hills contain spirits. It’s not clear that this experience would justify S’s belief that the hills contain spirits. Drug-induced experiences may cause all sorts of odd beliefs that aren’t justified on the basis of the experiences that caused them. Being caused by the appropriate experience may well be necessary for the justification of certain sorts of beliefs (e.g. appearance beliefs), though it seems to us that it is not the causal relationship that explains why the belief is justified; rather, it is the fit between the belief and experience that does the explanatory work.

It seems to us also that BonJour is right in thinking that the fit between belief and experience is not sufficient for justification of the belief. One needs to have access to this fit; the intuitions that drive moderate internalism apply even at the level of the properly basic. But we think that because it is clear that awareness of the matching between belief and experience is doxastic, BonJour locates proper basicity in the wrong place. BonJour thinks that beliefs of the form *I am being appeared to F-ly* are properly basic. However, if the awareness of the fit between this sort of belief and the experience of F are doxastic, they won’t be properly basic. At best, they will be one-level-removed from properly basicity, themselves based on a properly basic belief or properly basic beliefs. And this is exactly what we propose: Our stock of properly basic beliefs include those directly about experiences (beliefs that one is having various sensory experiences) and beliefs about the fit between those experiences and our beliefs that we are having those
experiences. For example, suppose S believes she is having an experience of a brown
table. Call this belief “B.” B is justified on the basis of S’s having a brown-table
experience (E) and S’s potential awareness of the fit between B and E (call this belief
“F”). But E and F are not sufficient for justifying B. Philosophers such as Chisholm
and Pollock

have thought that there are a priori epistemic principles that connect experience
and empirical beliefs. It seems to us that they were right about the a priori showing up in
the justification of empirical beliefs, but not right about where it applies. Consider the
knower reflecting on her empirical beliefs, and B in particular. She’s aware of E, and
suppose she is aware of the fit between B and E (F). But of what epistemic relevance is
the proper fit between one’s experience and one’s experience-belief? This is an a priori
matter, and there will be an a priori epistemic principle of the form If there is the proper
fit between an experience $E^*$ and an experience-belief $B^*$, then $B^*$ is justified to which
one must have access if B is justified.

Compare this to the treatment of inductive beliefs by a strong access internalist or
moderate internalist. Suppose a subject S has uniform experiences of a relevant sort in the
past, and on the basis of these experiences believes that some proposition $p$ will be true in
the future. Her belief that $p$ will be true is justified in part by her belief that she has had
uniform experiences of a relevant sort in the past, and in part by access to an a priori
epistemic inductive principle (roughly) of the form If a subject $S$ has uniform experiences
of a relevant sort in the past, $S$ is justified in believing that $p$ will be true.

Thus, on our account, experience justifies empirical beliefs at the level of beliefs
about experience (it is with these sorts of beliefs where fit or matching between
experience and belief is clearly important), and this is by way of a (potential) properly basic belief about the fit between experience and belief, and a (potential) *a priori* belief connecting experience-belief fit and justification of the relevant experience belief.

**BonJour** avoids construing the awareness of fit between experience and belief doxastically for two reasons. First, BonJour is afraid of epistemic regresses. However, it seems to us as though if anything is a candidate for proper basicity it is a belief that my experience matches my experience-belief. Such a belief clearly may be justified, though it is very difficult to see how it might be inferentially justified. So it seems to us as though BonJour should have admitted that AM is doxastic and taken it to be properly basic. Second, BonJour might think it peculiar to have properly basic empirical beliefs be metabeliefs. Usually properly basic empirical beliefs for an internalist are taken to be beliefs about experience. We agree that the account would be more elegant and perhaps more in keeping with the spirit of traditional internalist accounts of properly basic beliefs were it the case that experience-beliefs were properly basic. But they are very nearly so, and the beliefs that turn out to be are beliefs which involve experience, even if they aren’t beliefs just about one’s experience. Furthermore, the importance of the connecting belief between experience and experience-belief is clear in the same way the need for connecting beliefs at the thoroughly inferential level is. So, one is driven to accept (potential) connecting beliefs between experience and experience-belief.

**Fumerton** may well avail himself of this sort of solution to the objection that acquaintance certainly appears to be doxastic. Because it’s not as clear that the fact that P is as “internal” to the subject as her own sensory experiences are, though, it’s not clear that a claim that acquaintance with the fit between P and one’s belief that P is properly
basic is as robust as the claim a state like AM is properly basic.

Let us turn now to four serious objections to accounts of internalist proper
casicity. Doing so will give a better picture of the proposed mechanism of justification
of empirical beliefs, as well as allow one to see that the proposed view emerges intact
from these objections.

4.4 Objections to the Account

4.4.1 Sellars’ Dilemma

We begin with Sellars’ Dilemma, which has its origins in Sellars.

Suppose one says that apprehension of some sort of experience provides the justification
for a basic belief. Then, there is an apparent problem. BonJour gives a clear statement of
it.

On the surface, however, this answer is seriously problematic in the following
way. The picture it suggests is that in a situation of foundational belief, there are
two distinguishable elements, in addition to the relevant sensory experience itself.
First, there is an allegedly basic or foundational belief whose content pertains to
some aspect of that experience. Second, there is what appears to be a second,
independent mental act, an act of direct apprehension or of direct acquaintance
with the relevant experiential feature. . . . But the problem now is to understand
the nature and epistemic status of this second mental act itself.

[Here is the first horn of the dilemma.] If it is construed as cognitive and
conceptual, having as its content something like the proposition or claim that the
experience in question has the specific character indicated by the belief, then it is
easy to see how this second mental act can, if it *is itself justified*, provide a reason for thinking that the belief is true, but hard to see why it does not require justification of some further sort.

[Here is the second horn of the dilemma.] If, on the other hand, the mental act of direct apprehension . . . is construed as noncognitive or nonconceptual in character, as not involving any propositional claim about the character of the experience, then while no further issue of justification is apparently raised, it becomes difficult to see how such an act of direct apprehension can provide any reason or other basis for thinking that the original allegedly foundational belief is true.

So here is the dilemma. Either the direct apprehension of experience that justifies a basic belief has propositional content, or it does not. If the apprehension of experience has propositional content, then it can confer justification, but it also *needs* justification, and so the regress of justification has not been terminated. On the other hand, if the apprehension of experience does not have propositional content, then it does not need justification, but neither can it confer justification. Therefore the direct apprehension of experience cannot justify a belief, and the belief is unjustified. Either way, the foundationalist has not succeeded in explaining how an experience can justify a belief independently of any other beliefs.

Each horn of Sellars’ dilemma could be motivated by an argument from the nature of propositional content. To say that a mental state has propositional content is to say that it *makes a claim*. It says something, and what it says can be either true or false.
The nature of propositional content explains the first horn of Sellars’ dilemma. Any mental state that has propositional content makes a claim that could be either true or false. Why should we think that this claim is true, rather than false? Justification is required.

The nature of propositional content could also motivate the second horn of Sellars’ dilemma. If a mental state does not have any propositional content, then that is just to say that it does not make any claim. But if a mental state does not make any claim, then how could it justify a mental state that does make a claim? An analogy will illustrate the point. Suppose that someone justifies her belief that P by appeal to the testimony of an expert, but then she discovers that the expert’s testimony did not claim that P. Surely her belief that P is no longer justified. Why? If a person’s testimony does not claim that P, then it cannot justify the belief that P. And this does not seem to be unique to testimony. If S believes that there is a brown dog in the street, but then S attends closer to his experience, and S sees that his experience is of a black dog, then S’s belief that there is a brown dog is no longer justified, and that is precisely because S’s experience does not claim what S took it to claim. Thus, it seems that in order for any mental state to justify the belief that P, that mental state must have the propositional content that P. Thus, the second horn of Sellars’ dilemma also seems to be well motivated.

Another argument for this second horn of Sellars’ dilemma is due to Alvin Plantinga. Although he does not relate his argument to Sellars’ dilemma, it is clear that Plantinga’s argument is another way of arguing that if experiences lack propositional content, then they cannot justify beliefs. According to Plantinga,

BonJour suggested . . . what I am aware of makes it likely that the corresponding belief—that I am being thus appeared to—is true . . . But this cannot be quite
right: my awareness is not itself something with respect to which a proposition can be probable, because it is not itself a proposition.

Accordingly, as far as I can see there is not any sensible way in which my being appeared to redly can be the justification for my belief that I am thus appeared to; it cannot be itself a reason for my belief that I am being appeared to redly. That is because it is simply not the right sort of animal to serve as a reason: it is not itself a belief; it does not have a truth-value; it is not itself something from which something can be inferred; it does not itself possess propositional content.

When Plantinga says that experiences don’t stand in logical or probability relations, he is tacitly assuming that experiences do not have propositional content. Thus experiences do not have truth values. On that supposition, Plantinga argues that the explanation of proper basicality in terms of experience is problematic because an experience cannot stand in any of the sorts of relations that would seem to be necessary for conferring justification.

We think that there are at least two different ways to resolve Sellars’ dilemma, each of which is consistent with the theory that we have propounded here. The first resolution involves rejecting the assumption that experiences need to have propositional content in order to justify beliefs. The second resolution grants the assumption that experiences need to have propositional content to justify beliefs, but maintains that experiences have the sort of content that enables them to confer justification without needing any external source of justification. In what follows, we will begin with the first resolution, since it is simpler, and then proceed to the second resolution, which will
require more development.

One way to resolve Sellars’ dilemma is to grab the second horn, and maintain that although experiences lack propositional content, they can nonetheless confer justification on beliefs. The rationale for this position is that experiences do not need to assert anything, nor stand in probability relations in order to justify beliefs. Rather, the relation that grounds the conferral of justification is simply the relation of matching or fitting. The belief matches or fits the experience that justifies it, and that is sufficient for the experience to confer justification on the belief. Furthermore, this matching is sui generis and isn’t reducible in any sort of way. If this view is correct, then the internalist foundationalist can happily embrace the second horn of the dilemma.

BonJour himself claims that he “goes between the horns” of Sellars’ dilemma with his proposal.

However, it seems that he firmly embraces one horn of the dilemma. In particular, we think he embraces the claim that a non-conceptual phenomenal state can provide justification for a doxastic state—a basic belief, in this case. Consider this text from BonJour.

The important point for our purposes is that where such a relation of [matching or correspondence] exists, the character of the non-conceptual object [SC] is what determines whether the conceptual description [DC] is correct or true. And thus an awareness of that non-conceptual character can seemingly constitute a kind of reason for thinking that the description is true or correct.
This seems to be a clear acceptance of one horn of the dilemma—that experiential or sensory content can provide a reason for thinking that a belief is true. Now, perhaps one might claim that BonJour doesn’t grab one horn of the dilemma in that his account appeals to something like SC, and the dilemma mentions something like ASC. But this is hair-splitting. The core of the dilemma is this: Either our sensory states are to be conceived propositionally or not. If they are, then they themselves require justification. If they are not, then they can’t justify beliefs, because they’re too unlike beliefs to confer justification on them. The second horn is the one BonJour really grabs, and we concur that this is one possible way to resolve Sellars’ dilemma.

But suppose that experiences must have propositional content in order to justify beliefs. If this is correct, then how can Sellars’ dilemma be escaped? David Woodruff Smith once suggested that conscious mental states represent themselves.

Smith offered this hypothesis as a theory of the nature of consciousness—consciousness is self-representation. In recent years, this idea has been developed and defended at length by Uriah Kriegel.

For our purposes, we need not accept this hypothesis as an adequate theory of the nature of consciousness. What we propose is not a reductive theory of consciousness, but only the weaker proposition that conscious mental states do, necessarily, represent themselves. For our purposes, the self-representation of conscious mental states need not be what their consciousness consists in. Rather, we only maintain that it is a necessary truth about conscious mental states that they do, in fact, represent themselves. This is what we will call the thesis of the self-representation of conscious mental states.

Henceforth we will refer to this as “The Self-Representation Thesis.” If the self-
representation thesis is correct, then we believe this will suffice to resolve Sellars’
dilemma for foundationalism.

Imagine a conscious experience in which something appears red to you. The self-
representation thesis says that, whatever else it represents, this conscious experience
represents itself. More precisely, your experience of being appeared to redly represents
your being appeared to redly. The experience represents you to yourself as being a
certain way, namely, as being appeared to redly. In other words, your experience of being
appeared to redly has the propositional content that you are appeared to redly. If the self-
representation thesis is correct, then all conscious experiences have propositional content
like this. So is the self-representation thesis correct? It is beyond the scope of this chapter
to fully defend this thesis. It has been argued for at length in the aforementioned works
by Smith and Kriegel. Our goal here is simply to show that if the self-representation
thesis is correct, then there is a very plausible resolution of Sellars’ dilemma. If all
conscious experiences represent themselves, then they have propositional content, and
thus they are capable of conferring justification. But according to Sellars’ dilemma, since
these mental states have propositional content, they also need justification. However, this
generates no problem for foundationalists, because the self-representational content of
any conscious mental state is self-justified—it justifies itself.

The argument for the self-justification of the self-representational content of
conscious experiences is very simple and straightforward. The self-representational
content of a conscious experience is infallible. Since a conscious experience represents
itself, it cannot be mistaken with respect to this content. It cannot misrepresent, at least
not with respect to its self-representational content. It is plausible to suppose that any
infallible mental state is *ipso facto* justified. Therefore it is plausible to think that the self-representational content of conscious experiences is justified. Moreover, since the infallibility of self-representational content is intrinsic to it—indeed, independent of any other mental state, it follows that it does not depend, for its justification, on any other mental state, and so it is correct to say that it is self-justified. Therefore the contents of conscious experiences are self-justified.

If conscious experiences represent themselves—by representing their subjects as being a certain way—then conscious experiences have propositional content, and thus they can confer justification on beliefs. Since conscious experiences have propositional content, they also need justification. However, in their self-representational content, conscious experiences are infallible. Since they represent only themselves, they cannot be mistaken, and this is the source of their justification. They are justified by the fact that they are infallible. They pass even the strictest Cartesian standards of justification. So the regress of justifications terminates in the self-justification of the self-representational propositional content of conscious experiences.

In summary, we think that there are two responses to Sellars’ Dilemma open to us. First, we might follow BonJour in claiming that there is a matching or fitting between phenomenal experiences and beliefs about them, and this matching or fitting relation is the key to justification of experience beliefs. This matching is a matching between the descriptive content of an appearance-belief and the phenomenal content of an experiential state. Second, we might follow Smith and Kriegel in claiming that the self-representation thesis is true, and as a result experiences have propositional content. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the self-representation thesis actually entails that there can be a
relation of matching between a conscious experience and a belief about that experience—the matching consists in *identity of propositional content*. So henceforth we will simply speak of the relation of matching between a conscious experience and a belief about that experience; though this is consistent with the appearance-belief matching the phenomenal state via its phenomenal or semantic content (on the self-representation thesis). What we have argued here is that this relation of matching can be understood in either of these two ways. Either way, Sellars’ Dilemma is no problem for our view.

### 4.4.2 The-Paucity-of-Phenomenal-Content Objection

It is noteworthy that philosophers who focus on the role of experience in justifying beliefs about the external world talk often in terms of experience providing justification for beliefs such as “It appears to me as though there is a brown patch before me” or “It appears to me as though there is a red, bulgy object before me.”

Thus far we have said that appearance beliefs are justified in part by a fit between experience and the content of the belief. Likewise, S’s belief that,

(1) I believe it appears to me there is a brownish shiny expanse before me

is (in large part) justified by the fit between S’s brownish-shiny experience and the belief content in (1). But there are many other sorts of appearance beliefs that don’t have the form of appearance beliefs that one finds in the writing of sense-data theorists. What then about

(2) I believe it appears to me as though there is a table before me or

(3) I believe it appears to me as though there is my table before me.

One might object that there simply isn’t enough in experience to justify beliefs like (2) and (3). As a result, perceptual experience can’t serve as a ground for many justified
beliefs about the external world. So far as we can tell, no one has made this objection to the sort of account of the justification of beliefs about the external world that we offer here. Let us call this the paucity-of-phenomenal-content objection.

It seems to us as though there are two avenues of response that are open to us. First, one might think that beliefs like (2) and (3) are justified partially on the basis of experience and partially on the basis of other background beliefs about one’s perceptual situation. So, very roughly, (2) might be justified on the basis of (1) and on the basis of beliefs about where one is (e.g. one’s study), the probability of there being in one’s study different brownish objects of the shape one sees before one, and one’s memorial beliefs about the way one has modified the environment in which one finds oneself. A belief like (1) will be close to properly basic; whereas, a belief like (2) will be inferentially justified by way of many other beliefs.

One might object to this sort of account, however. Why can’t a belief like (2) be justified on the basis of experience? Clearly, a belief like (2) requires application of different and higher-level concepts to form than a belief like (1) does. But forming (1) still requires the application of some concepts, even if they are the basic sorts of concepts people like Berkeley and Locke associated with “sensory qualities.” Thus, the distinction between (1) and (2) here is invidious; there is no reason to think that (2) isn’t justified on the basis of experience if (1) is. And so it goes for (3). Why shouldn’t one say that it is my sensory experience that justifies me in believing that my table is before me?

Then, a second response to the paucity-of-content objection: Experience is rich enough to justify (1)–(3). (2) and (3) are not justified on the basis of elaborate inferences from beliefs like (1). Rather, experience carries with it both rich qualitative content and
quidditative content. S’s experience is experience not only of a brownish expanse, but also of S’s table. The disjunctivist in philosophy of perception may well hold to this sort of view.

In particular, it is a view of sense perception advocated by John Campbell and David Woodruff Smith.

This view has the virtue of allowing a uniform account of the justification of perceptual appearance beliefs.

So we suggest that we ought to think of perception in this fashion as a way of responding to the paucity-of-phenomenal-content objection.

4.4.3 Can a Metabelief Be Properly Basic?
A third objection proceeds as follows. The proposal on hand is that a metabelief involving the matching of experience and an appearance belief is properly basic. But this proposal fails on the ground that no metabelief can be properly basic: A metabelief B is justified only if its object belief B* is justified. So some other account of properly basic empirical belief must be found.

We think that this objection misses the mark, for we don’t think that being justified in holding a metabelief entails that one is justified in holding its object belief. For instance, a subject S may be justified in believing that she believes that ghosts exist, even if S is not justified in believing in the existence of ghosts. Indeed, in general, having a metabelief B that involves an object-level belief B* doesn’t even entail that one holds B*. Perhaps under the spell of an evil Freudian psychotherapist a subject S might come to
believe that he believes he wants to kill his father and marry his mother. But, later upon sober reflection, S might decide that he never did believe that he wanted to kill his father and marry his mother.

Now, in the case of our metabelief that there is matching between an appearance belief and an appearance, it may be that having this matching metabelief entails that one has the relevant appearance belief. For instance, it could be that the beliefs doxastically are too “close together” and thus one couldn’t have a case similar to the Freudian case. (The Freudian case works because beliefs can be compartmentalized and separated from each other.) But this wouldn’t impugn the proper basicality of the metabelief, so long as the matching metabelief doesn’t acquire its justification from the object-level belief. In our case, it doesn’t; rather, one is justified in holding the metabelief on the basis of “seeing” a fit between the appearance belief and appearance.

**4.4.4 Regress Problems**

A number of philosophers have thought that a view like the one we advocate here suffers from regress-of-justification problems. Two of the most compelling cases have been made by BonJour and Bergmann.

We will examine the arguments of each philosopher, and we will show that the view engenders no vicious infinite regresses.

**1. BonJour’s Regress Worries**

In *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, BonJour sets out his well-known argument against foundationalism.
If we let $\phi$ represent the feature or characteristic, whatever it may be, which distinguishes basic empirical beliefs from other empirical beliefs, then in an acceptable foundationalist account a particular empirical belief $B$ could qualify as basic only if the premises of the following justificatory argument were adequately justified:

1. $B$ has feature $\phi$.
2. Beliefs having feature $\phi$ are highly likely to be true.

Therefore, $B$ is highly likely to be true.

Clearly it is possible that at least one of the two premises of the argument might be justifiable on a purely a priori basis, depending on the particular choice of $\phi$. It does not seem possible, however, that both premises might be thus justifiable. $B$ is after all, *ex hypothesi* an empirical belief, and it is hard to see how a particular empirical belief could be justified on a purely a priori basis. Thus we may conclude, at least provisionally, that for any acceptable moderate foundationalist account, at least one of the two premises of the appropriate justifying argument will itself be empirical.

The other issue to be considered is whether, in order for $B$ to be justified for a particular person $A$ (at a particular time), it is necessary, not merely that a justification along the above lines exist in the abstract, but also that $A$ himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he believe the appropriate premises of forms (1) and (2) and that these beliefs be justified for him. In Chapter I and the previous section, I argued tentatively that such cognitive possession by the person in question is indeed necessary, on the grounds that he cannot be epistemically responsible in accepting the belief unless he himself has
access to the justification; for otherwise, he has no reason for thinking that the belief is at all likely to be true.

So, on our account, if S is justified in believing B: *It appears to me as though there is a table before me*, S is justified in virtue of a fit between experience and belief, S’s awareness of this fit, and a belief about the contribution such fit makes to justification of B. The belief B* that there is a fit between B and S’s experience E is properly basic, we say. But BonJour contends that if S is justified in holding B*, there must be some feature F in virtue of which S is justified in holding B*, and S must be aware of F. S also must be aware of the fact that a belief’s having F makes it very probable that it is true. If S is aware of F, presumably S has a belief (B1) that B has F, and this belief requires justification (if it is to justify B). But then S must have a belief B2 that B1 has some feature F1 in virtue of which it is highly likely to be true, and so on. The regress is vicious because each belief in the chain is supposed to justify the belief before it, but needs another belief for its own justification (assuming justification can’t “loop back” on itself in the way a coherentist imagines).

What should one say about BonJour’s argument? To begin, we reject the claim that the relation between justifier and justified has anything to do with the justifier making the justified more probable. The relation between justifier and justified could hold in a demon world where no such “probabilification” takes place. Rather, there are *sui generis* epistemic connections between certain sorts of beliefs and other sorts of beliefs in virtue of which one serves to justify the other.

But a rejection of this probability claim still doesn’t avoid the main regress worry.
Suppose that F doesn’t need to make probable the belief B, but merely confers some positive epistemic status or other on it. BonJour’s argument could be run again to the same anti-foundationalist conclusion. The foundationalist must insist that there is something different about the properly basic level that exempts them from a BonJourian strong-access requirement. Consider the inferentially justified belief,

(A) I believe there is a fire in my kitchen.

Now, the moderate internalist (of the sort we have sketched) will insist that if S is justified in holding (A), then there something—“X”—of which S is potentially aware in virtue of which (A) is justified, and S is potentially aware of the connection between X and (A). Suppose we take X to be there is smoke pouring out of my kitchen. If (A) is justified for S, then S must be able to access the proposition X and believe it, and, if S were to do so, S must be able to access the epistemic connection between S’s belief that X is true and (A).

But consider B*, again, the belief that there is a fit between S’s belief B and S’s experience E. It is difficult to see how B* doesn’t contain within itself the seeds of its own positive epistemic status; one need look no further than itself to see how it is justified. What sort of further feature F might be relevant to the justification of B*? So it seems to us as though BonJour’s strong access requirement is appropriate at the level of inferentially justified beliefs. But eventually one arrives at properly basic beliefs—and those are (nearly) self-justifying—and a priori beliefs.

2. Bergmann’s Regress Worries
Michael Bergmann recently has raised objections to the sort of foundationalism we advocate here that center on epistemic regresses. His objections are similar to BonJour’s objection, but sufficiently different to warrant consideration here. Bergmann takes an awareness requirement to be constitutive of internalism:

*The Awareness Requirement:* S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B—for example, evidence for B or a truth-indicator for B or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s justification—and (ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X. A view counts as a version of internalism only if it endorses this awareness requirement.

Why accept The Awareness Requirement? It is motivated, Bergmann thinks, by *The Subject’s Perspective Objection (SPO):*

If the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of what that belief has going for it, then she isn’t aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And that implies that it isn’t a justified belief.

The regress problems arise in the context of a dilemma he raises for internalism:

I. An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject’s actual or potential awareness of some justification contributor a necessary condition for the justification of any belief held by that subject.

II. The awareness required by internalism is either *strong* awareness or *weak*
III. If the awareness required by internalism is strong awareness, then internalism has vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism.

IV. If the awareness required by internalism is weak awareness, then internalism is vulnerable to the SPO, in which case internalism loses its main motivation for imposing the awareness requirement.

V. If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation for imposing the awareness requirement, then we should not endorse internalism.

VI. Therefore we should not endorse internalism.

A subject S has strong awareness of a reason R for a belief B when S conceives of R as relevant to the justification of B. A subject S has weak awareness of a reason R for a belief B when S doesn’t conceive of R as relevant to the justification of B. Now, we endorse a strong access requirement, and we do so for reasons similar to those set out in the SPO. The strong access requirement we hold involves potential beliefs that would serve as reasons were they formed. So, why should one think that III is true; why should one think that embracing strong (potential) awareness leads to radical skepticism?

Bergmann calls the access requirement we hold the *Potential Doxastic Strong Awareness Requirement* (PDSAR):

S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X that contributes to the justification of B and (ii) S is able on reflection alone to be aware of X in such a way that S justifiedly believes that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B.
Contrast PDSAR with the Actual Doxastic Strong Awareness Requirement (ADSAR):

S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B and (ii) S is actually aware of X in such a way that S justifiably believes that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B.

Now it is fairly easy to see that ASDAR leads to regress problems for the same reasons that BonJour’s access requirements lead to regress problems. Each justified belief requires another justified belief. But doesn’t PDSAR avoid this problem by requiring only potential beliefs? Bergmann argues that it doesn’t:

In order to have the justified belief B, S must be able to on reflection alone to justifiably believe that P1. And to justifiably believe that P1, S must be able on reflection alone to justifiably believe that P2. Thus to justifiably hold B, S must be able to on reflection alone to be able to on reflection alone to justifiably believe that P2. Given the plausible assumption that being able on reflection alone to be able to on reflection alone reduces to being able on reflection alone, we may conclude for every Pn in the series, S is justified in her belief B only if she is able on reflection alone to justifiably believe that Pn.

It doesn’t take very many levels of justification before one reaches the point that one can’t form the requisite higher-order beliefs required to justify lower-level beliefs; these higher-order beliefs would have as contents propositions that are too complex for us to grasp.
Suppose Bergmann is right in this last bit of reasoning and that we can’t grasp these very complex sorts of propositions. Does the rest of the argument show that PDSAR runs into regress problems? We don’t think it does, and there are two different responses we think are open to us. First, though, it is worth considering a reply to Bergmann that we think won’t suffice as a response. It proceeds as follows:

If I have a justified belief B, I have to be able to access a reason R for holding it. If I did access R, then I would believe that R and my belief that R would need to be justified. But if I don’t access R, no further justification is required. I don’t think that the best way to put the requirement is to say that on reflection alone I need to be able to on reflection alone form any sort of belief. Indeed, it is difficult to know what to make of this claim. A better way of putting the requirement is to say that I need to be able to form a belief B1 that serves as a reason for a justified belief I hold, and were I to do so I would need to be able to on reflection alone form a belief B2 that served as a reason for holding B1. Once one sees the access requirement in this fashion, one can see that no sort of transitivity applies here. I don’t need to have introspective access to reasons for reasons for beliefs I have, for instance (unless I’ve actually formed all requisite lower-level beliefs). Thus Bergmann’s argument that an access requirement like PDSAR poses no threat to moderate internalism.

The problem with this response can be seen if we consider a possible world W in which the epistemic subject accesses and believes R. Relative to W, there is a possible world W* in which the subject forms a belief R* which counts as a reason for R. And relative to W*, there is a possible world W** in which the subject forms a belief R** which counts
as a reason for R*. And so on. Is each successive world possible relative to the actual
world? It is hard to find a principled reason for limiting the accessibility relation in a way
that they aren’t. But then it follows that it is possible for me to form beliefs whose
propositional content is too complex for me to grasp. So this response to Bergmann won’t
work.

There are, however, two responses which we think show that Bergmann’s
objection poses no problem for us. First, one can see a way of responding to Bergmann if
one considers the actual structure of justification of particular beliefs. Let us consider
how a subject S’s belief B in the proposition there is a cup of coffee on the table might be
justified. (For simplicity’s sake, we’ll phrase the justification of this belief in terms that
don’t presuppose our account of internalist proper basicity.) First, S is justified in
believing

(1) A perceptual experience that the world is F-ish makes rational the belief that
the world is F-ish.

Second, S is justified in believing

(2) I’m having a perceptual experience that there is a cup of coffee on the table.
(1) is justified a priori; it is an a priori epistemic principle. (2) is properly basic.

And being justified in believing that (1) and (2) are true is sufficient for being justified in
holding B. There is no regress of reasons here. In general, regresses will be stopped in
this fashion. Connecting beliefs will be justified a priori (or will be instances of a priori
epistemic principles), and all other beliefs will be grounded in the properly basic. That
potential regresses can be stopped in this way is difficult to see if one considers the
architecture of reasons in the abstract, as Bergmann does. But if one looks at actual cases
of justification, one can see that there are no problematic regresses of a Bergmannian sort here.

Second, and most important, we think that there is a principled reason for ruling out propositions we can't grasp as being relevant to justification. Above, we said that we thought that justification is a *sui generis* epistemic property which isn't reducible to deontological properties. However, it is not inconsistent with this to suppose that satisfying one's epistemic duties with respect to believing \( p \) is sufficient for being justified in believing \( p \). Furthermore, one's duties with respect to believing a proposition \( p \) can't involve doing things that the subject can't do. So suppose we're considering a chain of meta-reasons for believing \( R \), where \( R \) is a reason for believing some proposition \( p \). There will be some \( R_n \) which is the most complex proposition in the series that a (random) human subject can entertain. Then one need not grasp any further, more complex reason \( R_{n+1} \) for \( R_n \) in order to be justified in believing that \( R \); satisfying one's epistemic duties doesn't call for doing what one isn't able to do. In this way, Bergmann’s regress is stopped.

In this chapter, we’ve set out and defended a version of internalist proper basicality similar to that of Lawrence BonJour’s. It is true that accounting for the foundations of empirical knowledge is more difficult for the internalist than it is for the externalist. But if we are right, the internalist does have something to say about the connection between experience and our justified beliefs about the external world.